CIS 4930: Secure IoT

Lecture 3

Prof. Kaushal Kafle

Derived from slides by Adwait Nadkarni, William Enck, Micah Sherr and Patrick McDaniel

Class Notes

- Homework I due today!
- Project proposals + team due Thursday!

—Plan to visit me personally with your group asap (within the next week).

- Class Website updated to include bug-bounty readings!
 - They are marked as **[BB]**
 - II papers in total
- Class schedule *slightly adjusted* for project deadlines
 - Both sections moved slightly later
 - First section deadline on 10/10
 - Second section deadline on 12/12
- See the updated syllabus and class schedule for details!

Cryptography



Crypto in IoT Apps

- Networks designed for data transport, not for data confidentiality or privacy
 - Internet eavesdropping is (relatively) easy
- Sensitive data is often stored locally on the device.
 - Other apps/root can get to it.
- Where have you seen crypto in practice?
- Crypto enables:
 - e-commerce and e-banking
 - confidential messaging
 - data transfer between IoT devices and cloud
 - protection of personal data
 - ...

Why is crypto useful?

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	161 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	56 [TCP Window Upd	ate] 8080 → 59584 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
	162 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	72 59584 → 8080 [P	SH, ALK] SEQ=1 ACK=1 W1N=408288 LEN=
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	167 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	44 19536 → 59586 [RST. ACK] Seg=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
	168 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	68 59587 → 19536 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=16344
	169 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	44 19536 → 59587 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
	170 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	68 59588 → 19536 [SYN, ECN, CWR] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0
	171 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	44 19536 → 59588 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
	172 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	68 59589 → 19536 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=16344
	173 2	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	ТСР	44 19536 → 59589 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
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Cryptographic History

- hide secrets from your enemy
- ~4000 year old discipline
 - Egyptians' use of non-standard hieroglyphics
 - Spartans used scytale to perform transposition cipher
 - Italian Leon Battista Alberti ("founder of western cryptography") invents polyalphabetic ciphers in 1466





Enigma

- German WWII encryption device
- Used polyalphabetic substitution cipher
- Broken by Allied forces
- Intelligence called Ultra
- Codebreaking at Bletchley Park
- See original at the International Spy Museum at DC



Some terminology

- **cryptosystem**: method of disguising (encrypting) plaintext messages so that only select parties can decipher (decrypt) the ciphertext
- cryptography: the art/science of developing and using cryptosystems
- cryptanalysis: the art/science of breaking cryptosystems
- cryptology: the combined study of cryptography and cryptanalysis

What can crypto do?

Confidentiality

- Keep data and communication secret
- Encryption / decryption

• Integrity

- Protect reliability of data against tampering
- "Was this the original message that was sent?"

Authenticity

- Provide evidence that data/messages are from their purported originators
- "Did Alice really send this message?"

cryptography < security

- Cryptography isn't the solution to security
 - Buffer overflows, worms, viruses, trojan horses, SQL injection attacks, cross-site scripting, bad programming practices, etc.
- It's a tool, not a solution
- It is difficult to get right: choices... choices....
 - Choice of encryption algorithms (many tradeoffs)
 - Choice of parameters (key size, IV, ...)
 - Implementation (std. libraries work in most cases)
 - Hard to detect errors
 - Even when crypto fails, the program may still work
 - May not learn about crypto problems until after they've been exploited

Crypto is really, really, really, really, really, really, hard

- Task: develop a cryptosystem that is secure against all conceivable (and inconceivable) attacks, and will be for the foreseeable future
- If you are inventing your own crypto, you're doing it wrong
- Common security idiom: "no one ever got fired for using AES"



Encryption and Decryption



C=E(M)M=D(C) i.e., M=D(E(M))

M = plaintext C = ciphertext E(x) = encryption function D(y) = decryption function Let's look at some old crypto algorithms (don't use these)

Caesar Cipher

- A.K.A. Shift Cipher or ROT-x cipher (e.g., ROT-13)
- Used by Julius to communicate with his generals

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- x is the key:
- Encryption: Right-shift every character by $x: c = E(x, p) = (p + x) \mod 26$
- Decryption: Left-shift every character by $x: p = D(x, c) = (c x) \mod 26$

KL

J

S E C U R I T Y A N D P R I V A C Y V H F X U L W B D Q G S U L Y D F B

Р

()

R





Cryptanalyze this ...

GUVF VF N TERNG PYNFF

Cryptanalyzing the Caesar Cipher

• Cryptanalysis:

- Brute-force attack: try 0.14

all 26 possible shifts (i.e., values of x)

Frequency analysis: look for frequencies of characters

 Also, same plaintext (repetitions) *always* leads to same ciphertext, since <u>monoalphabetic</u>



Polyaphebetic Cipher

- Improves on the simple monoalphabetic ciphers by using multiple monoalphabetic subsitutions
- Example:Vigenère Cipher
 - A set of Caesar Ciphers where each cipher is denoted by a key letter that designates the shift
 - The key repeats for the length of the message

key: deceptivedeceptivedeceptive plaintext: wearediscoveredsaveyourself ciphertext: ZICVTWQNGRZGVTWAVZHCQYGLMGJ

One-time Pads

- To produce ciphertext, XOR the plaintext with the one-time pad (secret key)
 - $E(M) = M \oplus Pad$
 - $D(E(M)) = E(M) \oplus Pad$
- Requires sizeof(pad) == sizeof(plaintext)
- Offers perfect secrecy:
 - a posteriori probability of guessing plaintext given ciphertext equals the a priori probability
 - given a ciphertext without the pad, any plaintext of same length is possible input (there exists a corresponding pad)
 - Pr[M=m|C=c] = Pr[M=m] (you learn nothing from the ciphertext)
- Never reuse the pad (hence "one-time")! Why not?

XOR properties

- A ⊕ A = ?
 - ▶ 0
- A ⊕ 0 = ? ≻ A

- $CI = MI \oplus Pad, C2 = M2 \oplus Pad$

 $MI \oplus M2!$





https://cryptosmith.com/2008/05/31/stream-reuse/

Modern Cryptography



Two flavors of confidentiality

- **Unconditional** or **probabilistic security**: cryptosystem offers provable guarantees, irrespective of computational abilities of an attacker
 - given ciphertext, the probabilities that bit i of the plaintext is 0 is p and the probability that it is 1 is (1-p)
 - e.g., one-time pad
 - often requires key sizes that are equal to size of plaintext
- Conditional or computational security: cryptosystem is secure assuming a computationally bounded adversary, or under certain hardness assumptions (e.g., P<>NP)
 - e.g., DES, 3DES, AES, RSA, DSA, ECC, DH, MD5, SHA
 - Key sizes are much smaller (~128 bits)
- Almost all deployed modern cryptosystems are conditionally secure

Recall: Encryption and Decryption



C=E(M) M=D(C)i.e., M=D(E(M))

M = plaintext C = ciphertext E(x) = encryption function D(y) = decryption function

Kerckhoffs' Principles

- Modern cryptosystems use a key to control encryption and decryption
- Ciphertext should be undecipherable without the correct key
- Encryption key may be different from decryption key.
- Kerckhoffs' principles [1883]:
 - Assume Eve knows cipher algorithm
 - Security should rely on choice of key
 - If Eve discovers the key, a new key can be chosen



Kerckhoffs' Principles

- Kerckhoffs' Principles are contrary to the principle of "security by obscurity", which relies only upon the secrecy of the algorithm/cryptosystem
 - If security of a keyless algorithm compromised, cryptosystem becomes permanently useless (and unfixable)
 - Algorithms relatively easy to reverse engineer

Key Sizes

- Original DES used 56-bit keys, 3DES uses 168-bit keys
- AES uses 128-, 192- or 256-bit keys
- Are these numbers big enough?
 - DES has 2⁵⁶ = 72,057,594,037,927,936 possible keys
 - In Feb 1998, distributed.net cracked DES in 41 days
 - In July 1998, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and distributed.net cracked DES in 56 hours using a \$250K machine
 - In Jan 1999, the team did in less than 24 hours
 - Each additional bit adds 2X brute-force work factor (exponential security for linear keysize increase)
 - There are approximately 2²⁵⁰ atoms in the universe, so don't expect 256-bit keys to be brute forced anytime in the foreseeable future (*with conventional computing*).
- Takeaway: 128-keys are reasonably secure

115,792,089,237,316,195, 423, 570, 985, 008, 687, 907, 853,269,984,665,640,564, 039,457,584,007,913,129, 639.936

2²⁵⁶ =

Cryptanalysis

- Goal: learn the key
- Classifications:
 - ciphertext-only attack: Eve has access only to ciphertext
 - known-plaintext attack: Eve has access to plaintext and corresponding ciphertext
 - chosen-plaintext attack: Eve can choose plaintext and learn ciphertext
 - chosen-ciphertext attack: Eve can choose ciphertext and learn plaintext

Which of these are passive/active attacks?

Other cryptanalysis ...

- Brute force cryptanalysis
 - Just keep trying different keys and check result
- Not covered in this class:
 - Linear cryptanalysis
 - Construct linear equations relating plaintext, ciphertext and key bits that have a high bias
 - Use these linear equations in conjunction with known plaintext-ciphertext pairs to derive key bits
 - Differential cryptanalysis
 - Study how differences in an input can affect the resultant difference at the output
 - Use chosen plaintext to uncover key bits

Symmetric and Asymmetric Crypto



- Symmetric crypto: (also called private key crypto)
 - Alice and Bob share the same key (K=K1=K2)
 - K used for both encrypting and decrypting
 - Doesn't imply that encrypting and decrypting are the same algorithm
 - Also called **private key** or **secret key** cryptography, since knowledge of the key reveals the plaintext
- Asymmetric crypto: (also called public key crypto)
 - Alice and Bob have different keys
 - Alice encrypts with K1 and Bob decrypts with K2
 - Also called **public key** cryptography, since Alice and Bob can publicly post their *public* keys

Crypto



Secret Key Crypto



3

Block ciphers vs. Stream ciphers

- Combine (e.g., XOR) plaintext with pseudorandom stream of bits
- Pseudorandom stream generated based on key
- XOR with same bit stream to recover plaintext
- E.g., RC4, FISH
- Block Ciphers
 - Fixed block size
 - Encrypt block-sized portions of plaintext
 - Combine encrypted blocks (more on this later)
 - E.g., DES, 3DES, AES

- $E(MI) = MI \oplus C(K)$
 - [C(K) = pseudorandom stream produced using key K]
- Useful when plaintext arrives as a stream (e.g., 802.11's WEP)
- Vulnerable if used incorrectly

- **Key reuse:** [C(K) = pseudorandom stream produced using key K]
 - $E(MI) = MI \oplus C(K)$
 - $E(M2) = M2 \oplus C(K)$
 - Suppose Eve knows ciphertexts E(MI) and E(M2)
 - $E(MI) \oplus E(M2) = MI \oplus C(K) \oplus M2 \oplus C(K) = MI \oplus M2$
 - MI and M2 can be derived from MI \oplus M2 using frequency analysis
- Countermeasure is to use IV (initialization vector)
 - IV sent in clear and is combined with K to produce pseudorandom sequence
 - E.g., replace C(K) with $C(K \oplus IV)$
 - IVs should never be reused and should be sufficiently large
 - WEP broken partly because IVs were insufficiently large
 - modern stream ciphers take IVs, but it's up to the programmer to generate them

- Substitution Attack:
 - M = "Pay me \$100.00"
 - $E(M) = M \oplus C(K)$
 - Suppose Eve knows M and E(M) but doesn't know K
 - She can substitute M for M' by replacing E(M) with:
 - $E'(M) = E(M) \oplus M \oplus M' = M \oplus C(K) \oplus M \oplus M' = C(K) \oplus M'$
 - Eve can then replace E(M) with E'(M), which Bob will decrypt message as M' ("Pay me \$900.00")
 - Encryption alone does not provide integrity: Countermeasure is to include message authentication code (more on this later) that helps detect manipulation (i.e., provides integrity and authenticity)